
En el invierno está contenida todas las primaveras...
"Los límites de mi mundo son los límites de mi lenguaje" Ludwig Wittgenstein
Uno de sus mejores poemas, dedicado al Amigo/a...
No es necesario que sea hombre, basta que sea humano, basta que tenga sentimientos, basta que tenga corazón.
Se busca un amigo para gustar de los mismos gustos, que se conmueva cuando es tratado de amigo.
Que sepa conversar de cosas simples, de lloviznas, y de grandes lluvias y de los recuerdos de la infancia.
Se precisa un amigo para no enloquecer, para contar lo que se vio de bello y de triste durante el día, de los anhelos y de las realizaciones, de los sueños y de la realidad.
Debe gustar de las calles desiertas, de los charcos de agua y los caminos mojados, del borde de la calle, del bosque
después de la lluvia, de acostarse en el pasto.
Se precisa un amigo que diga que vale la pena vivir, no sólo porque la vida es bella.
Se necesita un amigo para dejar de llorar.
Para no vivir de cara al pasado, en busca de memorias perdidas.
Que nos palmee los hombros, sonriendo o llorando, pero que nos llame amigo, para tener la conciencia de que aún se vive.

I've never been in the North. The only time I saw the Aurora Borealis was in a flight to Beijing when the plane was flying over Siberia. But my fascination with the stories related with the conquest of both the North and the South Pole was born with my very first memories as a child. Reading those illustrated encyclopedias I imagine myself on board of the Goja, or the James Caird.
This is a story told by a friend in the beatyful gardens of Sloane Street in London. Those of you who know the place will understand the beauty of the story and the beauty of place where it was told. My friend, Will Thomas Pondery is a well known researcher fascinated by the Artic, and once he starts to tell you something he can go for hours: The stroy is long but worth the effort.
To reach the village of Tuktoyaktuk, in the extreme north of Canada's Northwest Territories, you first fly to Inuvik, a town of 4,000 people inside the Arctic Circle that is, from the point of view of most Canadians, ridiculously far north in the first place. Then you drive north. You can do this only in winter, because about a mile outside Inuvik the road comes to an end; the rest of the journey is on a frozen river, and then, after a while, on the frozen Arctic Ocean itself. (In summer, when the sea melts, Tuktoyaktuk is accessible only by boat or turbo-prop plane.)
Before long, whiteness, tinged with blue, stretches to the horizon in every direction. You pass huge industrial ships, locked in place by the ice, abandoned for the season. Around this point, the -28C cold may begin to bite through your thermal underwear, and the guide who is driving you in his Jeep may start to say troubling things, such as, "The cracks in the ice are supposed to make it stronger, actually." Finally, after travelling for three hours, you reach the Inuit village of Tuktoyaktuk and drive back up on to shore - where, in one of the small wooden buildings, the mayor, a 45-year-old Inuk named Merven Gruben, will tell you he thinks the moral fibre of the place is in decline, because these days, whenever the temperature falls below -40C, the children get to stay home from school. "Wasn't like that when we were kids," he sighs. "If you ask me, we've gone soft."
It isn't hard, visiting the Canadian Arctic, to feel as though you have reached the back of beyond: a place at the edge of the map, empty except for the caribou and a few improbably hardy humans, who journey for miles to shop at Inuvik's solitary supermarket, which sells overpriced groceries shipped from "down south" - meaning the northern Canadian city of Edmonton - along with a small selection of snowmobiles. On the rare occasions that the region gets a mention in the Toronto papers, it's usually to update readers on the long-running comic saga of the local reindeer herd, 3,000 members of which went missing not long ago. It would be reasonable to conclude from all this that the far north of Canada was the kind of place the rest of the world had forgotten about. Recently, though, that hasn't been the case.
Take, for example, the fighter planes. The Canadian army abandoned a year-round presence at Inuvik years ago, but now it's back, encamped in an anonymous building out by the airport; Dez Loreen, the 25-year-old editor and sole reporter for the Inuvik Drum newspaper, watches from his office window as F-16 jets and Hercules cargo planes speed overhead. Meanwhile, the silent, icy expanses off the shores of Tuktoyaktuk have been a little less silent lately: a Canadian icebreaker has been plying the coastline, making its presence felt and annoying Inuit polar bear hunters, who fare better when the ice is solid. Early-warning stations, used in the 50s to monitor for Soviet missiles, are in operation once more, keeping watch at the top of the world.
Similar things have been happening across the Arctic, in Russia and Greenland and Alaska: military manoeuvres, scientific research projects and other displays of territory-marking. Thanks largely to the catastrophic effects of global warming - which are far more acute in the Arctic than elsewhere, partly because of the angle at which the sun's rays hit the ice - the polar region has become newly accessible. And suddenly it is the target of a gold rush. According to the US Geological Survey, up to a quarter of the world's undiscovered oil and gas may lie beneath the polar seabed - far more than Saudia Arabia's total known reserves - along with vast mineral wealth. Moreover, the melting ice seems likely to open up the Northwest Passage, the fabled Arctic sea route linking the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, to year-round commercial shipping. Nineteenth-century explorers dreamed of such a route; were it to become a reality now, it would transform how goods are shipped around the world - halving, for example, the distance by water between Japan and northern Europe.
Of course, it's bitterly ironic that global warming, caused by burning fossil fuels, should unleash a new scramble for more fossil fuels. But irony doesn't count for much in the oil business, and it proved no obstacle last August when Russia, in the most audacious move so far, dispatched a nuclear-powered icebreaker and two submersible craft to plant a Russian flag, housed in a titanium tube, on the seabed directly beneath the North Pole. "The Arctic is ours," declared lead explorer Artur Chilingarov, thereby staking Moscow's claim to 460,000 square miles of ocean floor, more than five times the area of Britain. Canada, apparently taken by surprise, responded by pledging a major military build-up in the north.
It was by no means the first time a country had claimed ownership of the pole or the area around it. Canada has done so (and once tried to assert its rights by threatening to impose a littering fine on a pilot forced to abandon his plane there). Denmark has done so, too (though it based its claim partly on Oodaaq, a 30m-wide outcrop off Greenland, which is Danish territory; the Danes, along with The Guinness Book Of Records, argued that Oodaaq was the northernmost land on the planet, but problematically, according to several reports, it has since disappeared). The US and Canada, although allies, have been disputing the boundary between Alaska and Canada off the north coast. But the truth is that nobody really knows who should be allowed to own what, in the farthest reaches of the Arctic, because until the melting began to accelerate, there wasn't much point in asking. The high ocean was a legal no man's land. In 1909, two Inuit guides were accused of murdering an American adventurer near the pole, but the case had to be dropped: nobody could work out who had jurisdiction over the ice where the alleged killing occurred.
Now, though, with the promise of oil and a navigable Northwest Passage, the question is urgent. Last month, reports prepared for the EU and Nato both warned of dangerous tensions between Russia and the west over polar resources. Nato will address the issue for the first time at a summit in Bucharest at the end of this month. Scott Borgerson, a former lieutenant-commander with the US coastguard, has warned of coming anarchy; he believes that unless the US takes charge to resolve competing claims to the Arctic, "The region could erupt in an armed mad dash for its resources." What is taking shape is a standoff that it is impossible to resist describing as a very cold war indeed.
After a few days in Inuvik - I was staying in a one-room cabin beside a lake on the outskirts of town - it became quite difficult to remember that I was there because of global warming. At -30C, which is an unremarkable temperature in the far north, the moisture in your nose freezes as soon as you step outside and breathe in. Breathing through your mouth triggers a coughing fit. The town has only one month of permanent darkness, in January, but even by March the sun barely rises above the horizon. With wind-chill, the temperature often plunges to -50C, though I encountered anything close to that only once, at 3am, looking at the northern lights.
The residents of Inuvik take a sardonic approach to these extremes. "Cold enough for ya?" they ask from deep inside their fur-lined parkas, when they realise you're an outsider. Perhaps it's not surprising that some will half-guiltily volunteer the view that a little climate change might not be such a bad thing. "This idea of global warming, telling us how warm we are - well, I have an idea that's by scientists who are all living in Bermuda," Willard Hagen, a former seaplane pilot who now chairs the local land and water board, told me one day as we kept warm in his pick-up truck, with the engine running. "Try living here for a while and then telling us about global warming." ("If you've ever had to work outside at -55C," says Andrew Applejohn, a polar researcher based in Inuvik, who certainly realises the perils of climate change himself, "you will understand the benefits of not working outside at -55C.")
The situation is dire: last year, the year-round polar icecap shrank to the smallest extent ever recorded by scientists, and to half the size of 50 years ago. Some climate experts believe the pole could be ice-free in summer within two decades, and environmental charities are calling urgently for a new international treaty to protect the Arctic from destruction. The complicating factor, though, is that the melting promises to uncork a steady flow of wealth from oil and shipping, and the Inuit, the aboriginal inhabitants of northern Canada, could certainly use that. For decades, they have been jolted from boom to bust and back again. The money came first from fur-trapping, until the industry collapsed, almost overnight in the early 80s, thanks to an American and European crisis of conscience (the price for a sealskin dropped from C$23 [£11.30] to C$7 [£3.40). Then plummeting prices drove away the oil firms. In their wake came alcoholism, drug abuse and suicide - challenges also faced by other indigenous communities around the Arctic, in Russia, Greenland and Alaska. Times are better now, but the economy of Canada's far north still runs largely on government welfare cheques. A navigable Northwest Passage, along with an active oilfield, would change all that. Admittedly, it may be bad news for the remaining polar bear hunters, who take wealthy Americans on sport-hunting trips across the ice, but it would turn Inuvik into a major regional hub, and the minuscule settlement of Tuktoyaktuk into a deep-water port - an Arctic equivalent, perhaps, of Rotterdam.
But Resolute and Nanisivik also occupy key strategic positions on the Northwest Passage, and the Canadians' bring-it-on stance was clearly also a warning to the US, Japan and some European countries - all of which have suggested that they consider the passage to be international waters, not Canadian territory. In a remarkably un-Canadian way, Harper seemed to be squaring up to the whole world. Around the same time, Russia ordered bomber flights over the Arctic Ocean for the first time since the collapse of communism.
The idea of a "law of the sea", in the sense of a globally agreed system of rules, is a fairly recent invention. Before the 1940s, things were simple: any nation with a coastline was entitled to exclusive rights over a small band of water, originally defined as the distance a cannon could be fired from land, but later extended. Beyond that, the concept of law had no purchase; the wild ocean remained "radically free", as William Langewiesche puts it in his book The Outlaw Sea. Then came the maritime equivalent of a landgrab: a 1945 proclamation by President Harry Truman, asserting exclusive US control of a huge stretch of the continental shelf, extending hundreds of miles from US coasts. Other countries made similar pronouncements, and before long drilling on the ocean floor was widespread. Utter chaos loomed, and at the United Nations in New York, negotiations began in an effort to agree a more orderly system. But it wasn't until 1982 that the members of the UN signed the Convention on the Law of the Sea. And perhaps unsurprisingly - for a document decided by committee, and with enormous implications for the distribution of the world's untapped oil wealth - it didn't make things much simpler.
In the vaguely sinister language of international diplomacy, the oceans that lie beyond the control of any one government are known simply as "the Area". (Oddly, the Area isn't administered by the UN, but by an independent organisation, the International Seabed Authority, based on a palm-lined street in Kingston, Jamaica.) The trouble begins when a country wants to lay claim to a chunk of the Area for itself: under UN rules, it must prove that the ocean floor is, in fact, an extension of its own continental shelf. That requires the collection of massive amounts of geological data, all of which must be submitted to an obscure UN body, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, within 10 years of a country ratifying the Convention on the Law of the Sea. Which is another reason why the question of Arctic sovereignty is suddenly urgent - those deadlines are starting to arrive.
Still, as Harper understood, the question of who owns the Arctic is only partly a matter of technical data and scientific judgments. What matters is presence. On the one hand, there are facts on paper, in the offices of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. And then there are the facts on the ice.
Asserting sovereignty over wild and inhospitable places has always been a matter of grand gestures. In the late 30s, the Nazis attempted to establish their ownership of a part of the Antarctic claimed by Norway by dropping swastikas on spikes from aeroplanes. In the 1940s, Argentina tried something similar on British Antarctic land, dropping metal cylinders containing documents asserting sovereignty. (British navy troops removed the cylinders and thoughtfully returned them to Buenos Aires.) Since 1959, the planet's southern extremes have been governed cooperatively, thanks to an international treaty, but the issue is not settled. Late last year, the Guardian reported that the UK is planning to claim sovereign rights over a huge area of seabed off the Antarctic landmass, in defiance of the treaty's spirit.
In the Arctic, this strangely childish approach to the politics of sovereignty reached its height in the dispute between Canada and Denmark over Hans Island, a tiny, uninhabited lump of rock that lies in a resource-rich channel of water between Greenland and Canada's far north-east. Alerted to the fact that a Canadian company had been carrying out research there, a Danish government minister landed in 1984 and planted a flag attached to a bottle of Danish cognac. Some years later, Canadian soldiers responded by leaving a bottle of Canadian rye whisky. Meanwhile, in a frivolous gesture that nonetheless feels a little passive-aggressive, the Canadian postal service has formally assigned a Canadian postcode to the North Pole: H0H 0H0.
Back in Tuktoyaktuk, I asked Mayor Gruben if he'd ever consider living anywhere else, and he said he wouldn't, because farther south there are "too many trees". "You can't see very far. You look out this window and you can see as far as you want. You can see for ever." Still, things are far from perfect: what Tuktoyaktuk really needs, Gruben said, is an all-weather road to connect it to Inuvik, and thus to the rest of Canada. Partly, no doubt, he believes this because his family business is the local construction firm, which would build it. But almost everyone in the village wants an all-weather road - and in the coming Arctic oil boom, they see an opportunity to get it, along with much else. Since 1984, when they reached a landmark settlement with the Canadian government, the local Inuit, the Inuvialuit, have had extensive rights over the region. So when oil companies seek permission to operate on Inuit land, the Inuit are in a position to demand certain things in return - such as roads and money for schools.
Currently, this back-and-forth is being played out over the Mackenzie gas pipeline, a long-awaited project that would take onshore gas from the far north and pump it south. But the income from the pipeline might pale in comparison with that from offshore oil and an opened Northwest Passage. "The native population along the pipeline route are expecting to make a free living for the rest of their lives," one non-native local man told me, expressing a resentment held by many. "They want horrendous royalties, they want new schools, they want new counselling centres, they want new highways. They want all this stuff given to them."
Looking back at the area's history, it might seem wildly optimistic to imagine that the Inuit would end up with a controlling hand in the coming oil boom. But good times were coming to Tuktoyaktuk, Gruben was sure. "Put it this way - there's another Prudhoe Bay out there," he said, referring to the vast oilfield off Alaska. "It's just that nobody's found it yet."
On my last day in Inuvik, I had a hangover. I'd spent the previous evening drinking with some new acquaintances in the town pub - the Mad Trapper - a large, windowless establishment with a slightly frontiersy feel. It was the kind of place in which I wouldn't have been surprised to have witnessed a bar fight or two; instead, what happened was that every half-hour or so an older Inuk would march up to the bar and ring a bell to signal that he was buying a round for everyone present. After our beers had been replenished like this a couple of times, I asked one of my companions what was going on. "Probably a residential school payout," he said, and suddenly I was drinking the most morally complicated lager of my life.
Later that day, I flew back to Edmonton, stopping en route at Yellowknife, the capital of the Northwest Territories. There, we had to get off, to pass through airport security: at Inuvik, where we'd boarded, there had been no metal detectors or luggage x-rays. Printed on the floor of the main hall - yards from a baggage carousel featuring a stuffed polar bear hunting a stuffed seal - there is a map of the northern hemisphere, with the North Pole at its centre: a view from the top of the globe.
It is jolting to look at the world this way, instead of in the normal school-textbook fashion, with America on the left and Australia on the right. You realise how nearly Russia touches the US at the 52 mile-wide Bering Strait; how Europe is even closer to North America at the point where Canada meets Greenland. And then, encircled by the various Arctic nations, there is the polar region itself, not on the fringes or sliding out of view at the top of the map, but unmistakably central, and breathtakingly huge: a pristine wilderness, or, from another point of view, a treasure too tempting to resist. ·




Valentina Rothmann, de 12 años, descubrió horrorizada que a muchos de los cadáveres que acarreaba les habían cortado las nalgas. Eso no fue nada comparado con la experiencia de otra joven, Vera Rogova, a la que persiguió un caníbal con ojos extraviados de hambre y un hacha. Maria Ivanovna se sorprendió al ver que, en medio de la carestía, unos inquilinos cocinaban carne; le dijeron que era cordero pero al levantar la tapa de la olla entre el caldo asomó una mano humana.
Parecen cuentos de terror. Sin embargo, son experiencias reales vividas durante el sitio de Leningrado, conocido como el de los 900 días (en puridad 872), uno de los peores asedios que recuerda la historia y en el que el frío -hasta 40 grados bajo cero- y el hambre se sumaron a la guerra y la oscuridad para configurar un cuadro de penalidad y espanto apocalíptico. Nadie sabe cuánta gente murió. Las autoridades reconocieron más de 600.000 ciudadanos muertos, pero otras cifras superan 1.200.000. En un libro recién aparecido que constituye un verdadero descenso a los infiernos (El sitio de Leningrado, 1941-1944, Crítica), aunque también un asombroso testimonio de la capacidad de supervivencia del ser humano y un conmovedor canto a la esperanza, el historiador británico Michael Jones, de la Universidad de Bristol, revive extraordinariamente aquel asedio -en buena parte a través del relato directo de los supervivientes y sus diarios- y ofrece datos nuevos que revelan toda la crudeza de un episodio de la II Guerra Mundial que fue manipulado por la historia oficial soviética y que desde hace tiempo sufría el olvido historiográfico.
Jones ha revisado al alza, por ejemplo, la escala en que se practicó el canibalismo. "La Unión Soviética suprimió deliberadamente toda la información sobre el particular. Archivos de la policía secreta que han salido recientemente a la luz muestran que más de 1.400 personas fueron arrestadas acusadas de canibalismo y más de 300 ejecutadas", explicó Jones a este diario. "Las cifras reales son sin duda mucho más altas. Durante el peor periodo del asedio, a finales de enero del 42 y principios de febrero, distritos enteros de Leningrado fueron invadidos por caníbales". El autor señala que había bandas organizadas, que un grupo de 20 caníbales se dedicaba a interceptar a los correos militares (para comérselos) y que en un lugar de la calle de Zelenaya donde se vendían patatas se pedía al comprador que mirara donde se guardaban y cuando éste se agachaba le golpeaban con el hacha en la nuca: una escena macabra que combina a Raskolnikov con Hannibal Lecter. La NKVD advirtió de que en los mercados se vendía carne humana. "Cruzar la ciudad era peligroso, y costaba confiar en los demás", recordaba una superviviente, que señalaba que se veían cadáveres mutilados por todas partes. A las mujeres les cortaban especialmente los pechos.
La extensión del canibalismo da la medida de la desesperación que provocó la carestía de alimentos. La gente se desmoronaba de hambre. La vida se redujo a tratar de encontrar comida. "El horror de lo que se vivió en Leningrado es casi inimaginable", dice Jones. La gente comía hierba, cola de carpintero, hervía el papel de las paredes, los cinturones de cuero, ¡los libros...! La "cocina de asedio" reveló una imaginación que ríete tú de El Bulli. "Se cambia gato por pegamento", rezaba un cartel. Llegó un momento en que morían 3.000 personas al día de inanición, luego 15.000, 25.000... Nadie tenía fuerzas para enterrarlos. Una madre sólo pudo arrastrar a su hijo muerto hasta el alféizar y allí lo dejó. Faltaba tanta gente que una obra de teatro sobre los tres mosqueteros se montó sólo con dos, y no es broma. Hubo epidemias de disentería, de tifus.
Los alemanes, y ésta es otra de las aportaciones de Jones, no querían meramente tomar la ciudad -Petersburgo, como la llamaba Hitler-. "El objetivo de los nazis era sellar la ciudad y matar de inanición a toda la población civil, dos millones y medio de personas. Incluidos medio millón de niños", recalca el historiador. "Esta decisión estaba motivada por el odio ideológico y racial. Y a ella se aplicaron con rigor casi científico. Los alemanes no hubieran aceptado ni siquiera la rendición incondicional de Leningrado".
El libro analiza meticulosamente la vertiente militar del asedio -la llegada de los ejércitos alemanes con la punta de lanza de los panzer de Manstein; la incompetencia criminal de los mandos soviéticos hasta el nombramiento de Govorov, el héroe de la ciudad sitiada; los intentos desesperados de romper el cerco; la lucha en la cabeza de puente Nevsky, en las orillas del Neva, donde cientos de miles de soldados rusos murieron peleando y donde aún hoy, apunta Jones, afloran sus restos-. Pero es mucho más que un libro de guerra.
"A diferencia de Stalingrado, batalla en toda regla, Leningrado, asedio estático, es en su corazón una tragedia sobre civiles, en buena parte mujeres y niños", recuerda el historiador. "Y por eso la historia resulta a menudo insoportablemente dolorosa. Escenas como la de los bracitos desmembrados colgando de los cables telegráficos cuando los cazas alemanes ametrallaron despiadadamente el convoy de niños evacuados... Es más que un estudio de guerra, es una narración de sadismo, de deliberada crueldad a escala de masas, y eso lo hace muy duro".
La gente sacó su lado peor, pero también el mejor. Pasaron cosas extraordinarias: se interpretó durante el asedio, tras lanzar la partitura desde un avión, la Séptima sinfonía de Shostakóvich, que había empezado a componerla en la ciudad antes de que lo evacuaran. Los músicos apenas podían tocar, por la debilidad, pero lograron unir a los ciudadanos en una retransmisión épica, de desafío a los nazis y al destino.
El espíritu indómito y la voluntad de seguir siendo humanos de los ciudadanos de Leningrado resultan, dice Jones, profundamente conmovedores. "La supervivencia del amor, del sacrificio y el altruismo en esas condiciones de horror es un hecho asombroso. La bondad, como el espanto y la abyección, también prosperó".
Otra evidencia nueva es que Stalin desconfiaba profundamente de la ciudad, por la tradición librepensadora de Leningrado y su independencia intelectual. Durante el asedio, la población tuvo que sufrir también un incremento de la represión.
Cómo pudo aguantar la gente todo aquello es un misterio. "Subestimaron nuestra voraz hambre de vivir", escribió una superviviente. "En circunstancias desesperadas, algunos degeneraron", observa Jones, "pero otros encontraron la fuerza para alzarse e incluso ayudar a sus semejantes. Ése es el mensaje de esperanza de Leningrado".

In the face of such overwhelming statistical possibilities, hypochondria has always seemed to me to be the only rational position to take on life. Consider, by the time you hit forty, your tattered heart has already thumped out a billion and a half beats: what can the chances be of any organ doing anything a billion and a half times and never making a mistake? Your 30 trillion or so cells have each replicated themselves a few thousand times: how could it possibly not be that a few of these cells would band together in that state of cytological anarchy that leads to cancer and death?
Consider anything the body does over and over, asleep and awake, consider the peril it invites every time it gets into a car, breathes a lungful—150 million times a year, not counting the hours of panicky hyperventilation—of sour and sickly city air, eats something too fatty or not fatty enough, and you are considering impending death.
Accidents happen but illness creeps up on you. Only in retrospect do you realize that you'd been ill all along. Of course as a hypochondriac I'd always known that I'd been ill all along, but I'd assumed a symptomless illness that ground me down not with its various discomforts but with its very existence."That's the worst thing about it," said the friend of the friend in absolute seriousness. "There are none."
When my friend told me the story we both laughed because we knew we were meant to laugh, but it wasn't genuine laughter. It's impossible to laugh and empathize at the same time.
But just as being paranoid doesn't mean they're not out to get you, so being a hypochondriac doesn't mean you're not about to die.